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We provide a uniﬁed analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately
known political preferences and costs of voting. Focusing on type-symmetric equilib-
rium, we show that for small electorates, members of the minority group vote with a
strictly higher probability than do those in the majority, but the majority is strictly
more likely to win the election. As the electorate size grows without bound, equilib-
rium outcome is completely determined by the individuals possessing the lowest cost of
voting in each political group. We relate our equilibrium characterization to Myerson’s
Poisson games, and examine the potential uniqueness of equilibrium.
JEL Classiﬁcations: C72, D72, D82.
Keywords: costly voting, free-riding incentive, coordination problem, underdog
eﬀect.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Rational voting theory, originally proposed by Downs (1957) in decision-theoretic terms,
and later formulated by Ledyard (1981, 1984), and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) in
game-theoretic terms, lays out the most basic incentives to vote and assumes that each agent
trades oﬀ the net beneﬁt of winning discounted by the probability of casting the pivotal
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1vote against the cost of voting.1 Despite severely underestimating turnout rate in large
electorates [Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985)], rational voting theory is still widely believed to
yield empirically reasonable comparative statics even in its purest form.2 P e r h a p st h i si s
why there is a renewed interest in the theory’s applications. Most notably, Campbell (1999)
applies the theory to rationalize election upsets by demonstrating that the minority group
is likely to win the election if the electorate size is suﬃciently large and if the minority
is composed of agents with relatively low cost-beneﬁt ratios. In a small electorate with
ex ante symmetric agents, Börgers (2004) shows that voluntary participation may lead to
too much turnout from the social viewpoint. Krasa and Polborn (2009) extend Börgers’
analysis to asymmetric groups and large electorates, and point to the potential beneﬁts of
mandatory voting policies.3 In two related papers, Goeree and Grosser (2007) and Taylor
and Yildirim (2010) examine the impact of releasing information about the distribution of
political preferences through pre-election polls, political stock markets, etc. on equilibrium
electoral outcomes and welfare.
While providing valuable insights, these papers have also recorded some important —
and at times startling — theoretical results. For instance, Goeree and Grosser (2007) for
small electorates, and Krasa and Polborn (2009), and Taylor and Yildirim (2010) for large
electorates have noted that even in the presence of a clear majority, each alternative is
equally likely to win the election in a type-symmetric equilibrium, which is also the basis
for Campbell’s ﬁnding. In addition, there seems to be a common understanding that an
agent’s vote becomes less pivotal as electorate size grows and/or others vote with a greater
probability. Finally, despite the inherent coordination problem among the supporters of
each alternative, Börgers (2004) establishes the uniqueness of type-symmetric equilibrium.
It is, however, often diﬃcult to discern what factors drive these results and how robust
they are, given that each paper employs a costly voting model with a varying degree of
generality. The present paper aims to ﬁll in this gap by providing a uniﬁed analysis while
taking the celebrated “paradox of not voting” as given. The model we analyze is a gener-
alization of Börgers (2004) and a slight variation of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985). There
are  agents divided randomly into two groups: supporters of alternative  and supporters
1See Aldrich (1997), Blais (2000), Feddersen (2004), and Merlo (2006) for excellent overviews of the
literature.
2See, Hansen, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1987) for empirical evidence, and Levine and Palfrey (2007) for
experimental evidence in favor of this model.
3On the same topic, also see Ghosal and Lockwood (forthcoming).
2of alternative . These political preferences are distributed independently across agents.
Moreover, within each group the costs of voting are also independently distributed. Each
agent privately knows both his realized preference and voting cost.4 Most signiﬁcantly,
this generalization allows for group-speciﬁc cost distributions with potentially diﬀerent sup-
ports. An agent receives a net beneﬁt normalized to 1 if his preferred alternative wins, and
0 otherwise. Agents decide whether to vote or abstain simultaneously, and ties are broken
by a fair coin toss. As is common in the literature, we focus on type-symmetric equilibrium.
Our main result pertaining to small electorates formalizes the “underdog eﬀect”: given
the same cost distribution, the members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher
probability than do those in the majority.5 Nonetheless, the majority never completely
loses its initial advantage. This contrasts with the political neutrality ﬁndings of Goeree
and Grosser (2007), and Taylor and Yildirim (2010) when voting costs are assumed ﬁxed
and equal for all agents.6 As electorate size grows without bound, consistent with Campbell
(1999), and Krasa and Polborn (2009), we show that only the agents with the lowest possible
costs vote, independent of the distributions of preferences and costs. Moreover, unlike Krasa
and Polborn, by allowing for diﬀerent cost supports across the two political groups, we
discover that each alternative is equally likely to win the election if and only if the lower
bounds of the supports are equal. Otherwise, the group with a cost advantage (in the sense
of the lowest possible cost) is strictly more likely to win, as intuition suggests.
Our equilibrium characterization of large elections also bridges a gap between the costly
voting model with a ﬁxed population size and Myerson’s Poisson games with a random
population [Myerson (1998, 2000)]. We demonstrate that a large election can be considered
a Poisson game — in Myerson’s sense — where the population mean is the sum of equilibrium
limit turnouts for each group and an appropriately deﬁned probability of voting for each
alternative in terms of these limits, which is, in general, diﬀerent from the initial distribution
of preferences.7
4As in the Ledyard-Palfrey-Rosenthal model, agents in our private-values setup are also diﬀerentiated by
their intrinsic preferences over political alternatives. Hence, we do not study the information aggregation
problem that is the focus of common-value models such as Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), Krishna and
Morgan (2008), and Razin (2003).
5To be sure, the underdog eﬀect has been articulated in several empirical and experimental studies, the
most recent being Levine and Palfrey (2007); but, to our knowledge, it has not been formally shown in a
framework as general as ours.
6Such an underdog eﬀect is not present in Börgers (2004) due to ex ante symmetry.
7Myerson (1998, pp. 386-92) makes a similar point but within a numerical example with a ﬁxed cost of
voting.
3Finally, we establish a suﬃcient condition for equilibrium uniqueness, which is satisﬁed
if agents are suﬃciently symmetric. In doing so, we demonstrate that Börgers’ (2004)
uniqueness result with symmetric agents is robust to small perturbations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up the formal
model, followed by the equilibrium characterizations for small and large electorates in Sec-
tions 3 and 4, respectively. In Section 5, we examine the question of equilibrium uniqueness,
and we gather some concluding remarks in Section 6. The proofs not appearing in the text
have been relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
There are  ≥ 2 agents who may cast a vote in an election between two alternatives,  =
. Each agent  privately knows his 2-dimensional type,  =(  ), consisting of his
political preference  ∈ {} and his cost of voting . Political preferences are inde-
pendently drawn from a Bernoulli distribution with  ∈ (01) representing the probability
of alternative , and conditional on these preferences, the agents who favor alternative
 pick their voting costs independently from the diﬀerentiable distribution () where
0
()=()  0 for all  ∈ [] ⊂ R+. Note that we allow voting costs across the
two political groups to diﬀer not only in their densities but also in their supports.8 Upon
privately observing their types, agents simultaneously choose whether to vote for their pre-
ferred alternative or to abstain. The election is decided by a simple majority rule and ties
a r eb r o k e nb yaf a i rc o i nt o s s . A g e n t receives a gross payoﬀ normalized to 1 if  wins;
and 0 otherwise.
Action/Outcome  wins  loses
Abstain 1 0
Vote 1 −  −
Table 1:E xP o s tP a y o ﬀso fA g e n t
As is clear from Table 1, abstaining strictly dominates voting for one’s less preferred alter-
native, resulting in “sincere” voting in this setup.9 In order to rule out trivial equilibria
in which it is a dominant strategy for all agents in some political group to abstain or for
8If  = , then supports must, of course, be the same, but the converse is not true.
9Unlike a private values election, sincere voting, in general, does not obtain in equilibrium with common-
values. However, Krishna and Morgan (2008) have shown that if voting is costly, then there always exists
an equilibrium with sincere voting.
4all to vote with certainty, we assume 0    1
2  . All aspects of the environment are
common knowledge. In the analysis below, we frequently refer to political group  as the
majority and 0 as the minority if   0, because, with   0, the expected size of
group  is strictly greater than that of group 0.10
3 Equilibrium in Small Electorates
As is standard in the costly-voting literature, we concentrate on type-symmetric Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in which all agents preferring alternative  f o l l o wt h es a m ee q u i -
librium strategy. It is straightforward to verify that in a type-symmetric BNE, agents adopt
ac u t o ﬀ strategy in which a player favoring  votes if and only if his cost is less than some
critical level, ∗
. In order to characterize such a BNE, denote the ex ante probability that
at y p e agent11 votes by  ≡ (∗
),a n dt h eex ante probability that an agent votes
for alternative  by  ≡ . Hence, the ex ante probability that an agent abstains is
(1 −  − 0). Now, recall that the number of ways  other agents can vote for , 0 can
vote for 0,a n d − 1 −  − 0 can abstain is given by the trinomial coeﬃcient
µ
 − 1




!0!( − 1 −  − 0)!

Given this, the net expected utility from voting to an agent with voting cost, ,a n dp o l i t i c a l





























0 (1 −  − 0)−2−2
for  = ,  6= 0,a n db·c is the usual operator that rounds a number to the lower integer
when necessary.
10This terminology is commonly used in the literature, e.g., Campbell (1999), Goree and Grosser (2007),
and Krasa and Polborn (2009).
11To avoid repetition, we sometimes abuse terminology and say "type"  to refer to one’s political type
only, keeping in mind type also includes his cost.
5To understand expression (1), observe that ( 0) is the probability that a type
 agent casts a decisive vote; i.e., that his vote is pivotal in determining the outcome when
each of the other −1 agents: votes for  with probability , votes for 0 with probability
0, and abstains with probability 1 −  − 0. In particular, his vote may be pivotal for
one of two reasons corresponding to the two summations in (2). First, if  of the other
agents vote for ,  vote for 0,a n d − 1 − 2 abstain, then the agent in question will
break a tie by voting. The ﬁrst summation in (2) is, therefore, the probability that the
agent breaks a tie that would otherwise occur. Second, if  agents vote for alternative ,
 +1vote for 0,a n d − 2 − 2 abstain, then the agent in question will create at i eb y
voting. The second summation in (2) is, therefore, the probability that the agent in question
creates a tie when alternative 0 would otherwise have won. When his vote breaks a tie, the
probability that alternative  is implemented rises from 12 to 1, and when his vote creates
a tie, the probability that  is implemented rises from 0 to 12. This accounts for the factor
12 in (1). Of course, when an agent votes, his net expected beneﬁtm u s ta l s oa c c o u n tf o r
his voting cost, .
An important step in understanding equilibrium voting behavior now, and the possibility
of equilibrium uniqueness later, is to derive some basic properties of the pivot probability.
To our knowledge, these properties have not been recorded elsewhere, except for the special
case of  = 0.
Lemma 1. For ( 0) ∈ (0 ) × (0 0) where 0 =  and  6= 0,




0   =2
 − 0    2

(iii) 








(iv) ( 0) ( 0+2 ) ,b u t( ) ( +1 ) .
To aid with discussion, it is worth repeating that ( 0) is the probability that
t h ev o t eo fa ni s o l a t e dt y p e agent is pivotal given the voting probabilities of the other
 − 1 agents. Now, to understand part (i) of the lemma, suppose   0.I nt h i sc a s e ,i t
is likely that alternative  has more votes than 0, and therefore a vote for  (which widens
the expected lead) is less apt to be pivotal than a vote for 0 (which narrows it). Part (ii)
6says that an increase in the probability of voting for alternative 0 makes a vote for  more
likely pivotal because it closes the gap in voting probabilities between the two alternatives.
Hence, the pivot probability of a vote for  is nonmonotonic in the probability of voting for
0, peaking at the point where 0 = .12
Part (iii) reveals that the vote of an isolated type  agent is less apt to be pivotal when
the probability that all other type  agents vote increases, provided they vote with higher
probability than type 0 agents (i.e., when the gap in voting probabilities increases). The
converse is, however, not necessarily true. In other words, if   0, it is not necessarily
true that the vote of an isolated type  agent is more apt to be pivotal when  increases
(i.e., the gap in voting probabilities decreases). Part (iii) implies that an agent views his
vote as a substitute to the voting probability of others’ who share his political preference, so
long as this probability is not too far behind the probability for the competing alternative,
and as a complement otherwise.13
Finally, part (iv) reveals that a vote for  becomes less apt to be pivotal when the
electorate size increases by two. Intuition suggests that as the electorate grows, the pivot
probability should decrease for all . This turns out not to be true in general. For some ﬁxed
pair ( 0),at y p e agent’s vote actually may be more likely to be pivotal as  increases
by one.14 This nonmonotonicity is a consequence of the diﬀerent ways ties can occur when
 is odd or even, and seems to be especially relevant in small electorates. Nonetheless, the
monotonicity of the pivot probability is restored, if one takes increments by two rather than
one, or compute it on a particular path such as  = 0, as in Börgers (2004), Goeree
and Grosser (2007), and Taylor and Yildirim (2010). The latter plays a crucial role in
establishing equilibrium uniqueness for these papers — an issue we address in Section 5.
In a type-symmetric equilibrium, the net expected payoﬀ of a type  agent with the
cutoﬀ cost, ∗
















 − )=0.( 3 )




  0,t h e nat y p e agent would not
be indiﬀerent but would prefer to vote with certainty, violating the deﬁnition of ∗
 as a cost
12This makes sense, because if 0 = , then each alternative is equally likely to win, making a vote for
 decisive with the highest probability.
13Note that since

( )  0 and

0 ( )=0 , it follows that

 ( )  0,a s
found in Börgers (2004), Goeree and Grosser (2007), and Taylor and Yildirim (2010).











0(1 − 2) Hence, ( 0) ( 0+1 )whenever  
1
2.




  0, then the agent would prefer to abstain with
certainty or would have ∗
 = .F i n a l l y ,i f∗
  , then the agent would, by the deﬁnition
of ∗
, vote for some cost realizations, but because 1
2  , not for all. Thus, in equilibrium,
he must be indiﬀerent at the cutoﬀ cost.
Given  ≡ (∗
),  ≡ , and deﬁning










we can rewrite (3):
Φ(∗
 ∗




Finding an equilibrium, therefore, amounts to ﬁn d i n gap a i r(∗
 ∗
) ∈ [0 ]×[0 ]
that satisﬁes (4).
Proposition 1. There exists a type-symmetric equilibrium, and every type-symmetric
equilibrium has the following properties:
(i) ∗
  1 for all ;a n d∗
  0 for some .
(ii) If ∗
 =0 ,t h e n  0.




  0;a n d 1
2  Pr{
wins}  1.





;a n d0  Pr{ wins} ≤ 1
2.
Proof. Let Ψ( ) ≡ ((1
2( ) (1
2( )).F r o m ( 4 ) , i t i s
clear that an equilibrium pair (∗
 ∗
) is a ﬁxed point of Ψ.S i n c e Ψ maps the
compact and convex set [0 ]×[0 ] into itself, and it is continuous in this region,
by Brouwer’s ﬁxed theorem, there exists a type-symmetric equilibrium. Next, we
prove each part in turn.
(i) Suppose, to the contrary, ∗
 =1 ,o re q u i v a l e n t l y∗
 = (6=0 )for some . Then,
since 1
2  ,w eh a v eΦ( ∗
0)  0,w h i c h ,f r o m( 4 )i m p l i e s∗
 =0 , yielding a
contradiction. Hence, ∗
  1 for all . Next, suppose ∗
 =0 ,o r∗
 =0for all .




 0, contradicting (4). Thus, ∗
  0 for some .
8(ii) Let ∗
 =0for some . Then, ∗







0  0. From (2), note that (0 ∗
0)=
(1 − ∗









0)−2 −  ≤ 0, and imply ∗
0   because ∗
0 ∈ (01).
(iii) Suppose  =  =  and   , but, to the contrary, ∗
 ≤ ∗
.W e m a k e
two observations. First,  =  implies  = , and thus ∗
 ∗













































,( 4 )f u r -
ther reveals ∗
  ∗





































,i ti sc l e a rt h a tPr{ wins}  Pr{ wins}, and hence Pr{ wins}  1
2.
Moreover, given ∗
  1, Pr{ wins}  1.
(iv) Suppose  = ,a n d ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates , but, to the con-
trary, ∗
  ∗
. This means ∗


























)),w h i c h ,b e -





Then, by Lemma 1, we have ∗
 ≤ ∗
, yielding a contradiction. Hence, ∗
 ≤ ∗
.S i n c e
 = ,t h i si m p l i e s∗
 ≤ ∗
. Finally, note from (5) that 0  Pr{ wins} ≤ 1
2. ¥
Proposition 1 highlights some basic properties of a type-symmetric equilibrium.15 Part
(i) indicates that in equilibrium, no individual votes with certainty. This is because the
15The existence of a type-symmetric equilibrium is well-established in the literature, e.g., Ledyard (1984)
and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985). Nevertheless, this is — to the best of our knowledge — the ﬁrst formal
derivation of the equilibrium properties for a small electorate.
9maximum beneﬁtf r o mv o t i n gi s1
2 and 1
2  . P a r t( i )a l s oi n d i c a t e st h a ta tl e a s ts o m e
individuals are expected to vote. However, even though we have ruled out abstentions
due to high costs, i.e,   1
2, it is possible that members of some political group abstain
altogether for strategic reasons. Part (ii) reveals that if such full abstention occurs, the
main reason must be the individuals with low costs of voting in the rival group and not
necessarily the distribution of political preferences. Another important implication of part
(ii) is that if  = 0, then the expected probability of voting is strictly positive for all
individuals irrespective of the cost and political preference distributions. Hence, the knife-
edge case of equal cost lower bounds, often assumed in the literature, seems to rule out the
interesting case of complete abstention by one group. In our analysis of large elections, this
knife-edge case will also be the source of a strong “neutrality” result.
Part (iii) formalizes the “underdog eﬀect” alluded to in the introduction: given identical
cost distributions, an agent in the minority group is strictly more likely to vote. This is due
to the well-known tension between one’s incentives for winning the election and free-riding
on his fellow group members. Not surprisingly, the latter incentive is less pronounced in a
smaller group. Nonetheless, part (iii) shows that the underdog eﬀect never outweighs the
initial majority advantage, and hence the majority is strictly more likely to win in a small
electorate. Part (iv) examines the counterpart of (iii). When each agent is equally likely to
support either alternative, the group whose members are more likely to have higher voting
costs is less likely to win the election.
Proposition 1 puts a perspective on recent studies of the costly-voting model with a
small electorate. As mentioned in the Introduction, Börgers (2004) examines the symmetric
s e t u pi nw h i c h =  and  =  so that the underdog eﬀect does not emerge. Goeree
and Grosser (2007), and Taylor and Yildirim (2010) allow for  6= ,a n ds h o wt h a t
each group is equally likely to win the election. Part (iii) of Proposition 1 indicates that
their assumption of a ﬁxed and equal voting cost for all agents plays a crucial role in this
“neutrality” result, because when there is cost uncertainty, the majority is strictly more
likely to win even if the cost distributions are identical.
The underdog eﬀect identiﬁed in Proposition 1 raises an important question: Does an
increase in population size necessarily improve the majority’s chances of winning? To answer
this question, suppose  =  and   .L e tPr{ wins|} ≡ (∗
() ∗
()) for
a pair of equilibrium strategies (∗
() ∗
()). Then, by adding and subtracting the term
10(∗
() ∗
()+1), the change in the majority’s probability of winning can be written,








( +1 )  ∗






Hence, an increase in population size has two eﬀects on group A’s probability of winning.
() represents the direct (scale) eﬀect because strategies are kept equal, and () repre-
sents the strategic eﬀect because population size is kept equal. The following lemma shows
that while the direct eﬀect is always positive, the strategic eﬀect can counteract and even
overwhelm this positive eﬀect.
Lemma 2. Suppose  =  and   . Fix a pair of equilibrium voting strategies
(∗
() ∗
()).T h e n ,()  0 for all . Moreover, for an inﬁnite subsequence of
, ()  0 and ()+()  0
Proof. Suppose  =  and   . Fix a pair of equilibrium voting strate-
gies (∗
() ∗
()).D e ﬁne () ≡ (∗
() ∗
()). By Proposition 1, ∗
() 
∗













())−2  0 and ()  1
2 for all . Moreover, given  = ,w eh a v e
() → 1
2 as  →∞by Proposition 2 below. This means (+1)−()  0 for some
;o t h e r w i s ei f(+1)−() ≥ 0 for all ,t h e n() would not converge to 1
2.T h i s
also means that ( +1 )− ()  0 for an inﬁnite subsequence of ; otherwise there
would exist some   ∞ such that ( +1 )− () ≥ 0 for all  ≥ , contradicting
again the fact that () → 1
2 as  →∞ .B y d e ﬁnition, ()+()  0 and thus
()  0 whenever ( +1 )− ()  0. ¥
Lemma 2 answers the question we posed: an increase in population size does not neces-
sarily improve the majority’s chances of winning. It says that there is an inﬁnite subsequence
of population size under which the strategic eﬀect due to strategic voting is suﬃciently neg-
ative to diminish the probability of winning for the majority. Note that if there were no
strategic voting so that     0 were ﬁxed, then clearly ()=0 ,a n d( )
would monotonically increase and converge to 1 as  grows.16 To gain further insight and
16To be sure, Lemma 2 provides only a partial characterization of Pr{ wins|} in . A full characteri-




(), which, in light of Lemma 1, does not appear to
be feasible unless one is willing to make strong assumptions on preference and cost distributions.
11motivate our analysis of large elections, we brieﬂy report a numerical example in which
()  0 for all  and it dominates ()  0 after  becomes suﬃciently large, yielding a
hump-shaped winning probability for the majority.
Example 1. Let each agent draw his cost of voting independently from a uniform distri-
bution in (021),a n d = 55. Solving numerically for equilibrium (unique in this
case for each ), we ﬁnd:
 5 50 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000
∗
 15661 07063 05454 02104 00641 00141 00019
∗
 13578 06207 04805 01876 00588 00136 00018
Pr{    } 53204 56492 57945 64064 68357 62688 52780
Table 2. Nonmonotonicity of winning probability in electorate size
Although many voting situations such as boards of directors and congressional commit-
tees involve small electorates, many others such as referendums are about large electorates,
which we investigate next.
4 Equilibrium in Large Electorates
We have three main objectives in this section. First, we want to determine if the limit
turnout depends on the initial distribution of political preferences. Second, we wish to
identify conditions (if any) under which the advantage from being the majority group or
the group with stochastically lower cost vanishes as the population becomes large. Third,
we would like to know if large elections with ﬁxed population size can be interpreted as
Myerson’s Poisson games with an appropriately assigned distribution of political preferences.
We begin the analysis with the following well-known result:
Lemma 3. In equilibrium, lim→∞ ∗
()=0and lim→∞[∗
()] = ∗
  ∞ for  =
.
As ﬁrst shown by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), Lemma 3 establishes that the individ-
ual probability of voting, and thus the turnout rate, becomes negligible in large elections.
Moreover, the expected limit turnout for each alternative is ﬁnite. If it were inﬁnite for
some alternative, then each vote would be negligible, and no individual would vote given a
strictly positive cost. But then, each vote would become pivotal with probability 1, yielding
a contradiction.
12Lemma 3 implies that in large elections, the equilibrium cutoﬀ for each alternative must







≤  (=  whenever ∗
()  )f o r 0 =
 and  6= 0.
In order to determine expected voter turnout in the limit, consider the situation facing
a representative agent favoring alternative  and suppose that the other  − 1 agents vote
if and only if their costs are less than the equilibrium cutoﬀ ∗
().L e t−1 and −1
be the number of votes for alternatives  and , respectively. Furthermore, let 0−1 =
−1−−1−−1 be the number of abstentions. Using this notation, a type  agent’s
vote will be pivotal if and only if 0−1 = −1 (he breaks a tie) or 0−1 = −1+1





−1} +P r {∗
0−1 = ∗
−1 +1 } (7)








1).N o t et h a t∗
−1 and ∗
−1 are not independent for ∞, but the following result
establishes independence in the limit.
Lemma 5. The limiting marginal distributions, ∗
∞ and ∗
∞ are independent Poisson
distributions with means ∗
 and ∗
, respectively. Hence, the limiting distribution
of ∗
∞ + ∗
∞ is Poisson with mean ∗
 + ∗
.
In light of Lemma 5, let (|) be the p.d.f. for a Poisson distribution with mean .
Recall that (|)=
−






























0) −  ≤ 0 ( =  if ∗
  0) (9)
Proposition 2. Without loss of generality, suppose  ≤ .T h e n ,






 =0 if  ≤ 
∗
  ∗
  0 if     
∗
 = ∗
  0 if  = 
(ii) Given , ∗
 is strictly decreasing and ∗
 is weakly increasing in .
(iii) Given , the limiting probability, lim→∞ Pr{    },i ss t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n gi n,
and equal to 1
2 for  = .



















!( +1 ) !
#

Hence, (9) implies ∗
 ≥ ∗
.G i v e n(00) = 1 and   1
2, (9) also implies ∗
  0.
Moreover, ∗
 =0if and only if 1
2(0 ∗
) −  ≤ 0 and 1
2(∗






, this means ∗
 =0i fa n do n l yi f
2[1 − ln(2)] ≤ 2.N o t et h a tf o r ∈ (01), the function ()=(1 − ln) satisﬁes:
lim→0+ ()=0 , lim→1− ()=1 , () and 0()  0. Hence, there exists a unique
cost  ∈ (0 ) that solves 2[1 − ln(2)] = 2.C l e a r l y ,2[1 − ln(2)] ≤ 2 for all
 ≤ ,a n d∗
 =0as a result. For  ∈ ( ],w eh a v e∗
  0,a n db y( 9 ) ,∗
 = ∗

i fa n do n l yi f = , proving part (i).
Next, if  ≤ ,t h e n∗
 =0and 1
2−∗
 =  by part (i). Thus, ∗
 is strictly
decreasing in . Now, suppose  ∈ ( ). Then, by part (i), ∗
  ∗














)  0; 
(∗
 ∗
)  0;a n d 
(∗
 ∗
)  0. From here, it follows
that ∗
 is strictly decreasing and ∗
 is strictly increasing in .














It is easy to verify that the r.h.s. is strictly increasing in ∗
 and strictly decreasing in ∗
.
Part (iii) then follows from part (ii). ¥
Proposition 2 is a key result of this paper. The most important observation is that the
limit turnouts and the probability of winning are completely determined by the individuals
w i t ht h el o w e s tc o s to fv o t i n gi ne a c hg r o u p—not by the distributions of voting costs,  or
political preferences, . This is because the free-rider problem in each group is ampliﬁed as
14the electorate size grows, leaving only the lowest cost agents to vote. As part (i) indicates
however, one group may abstain altogether if the cost diﬀerential is suﬃciently large, and
such a cost diﬀerential always exists. Nonetheless, because the limit turnout for each group
is ﬁnite, there is still a signiﬁcant probability that the abstaining group will win.17If the cost
diﬀerential is not too high, Proposition 2 leads to the intuitive observation that the group
with the lowest possible cost is expected to turn out in larger number and thus more likely
to win the election. In addition, as the cost diﬀerential increases, so does the probability of
winning for the low-cost group.
Proposition 2 achieves the ﬁrst two objectives set in the beginning of this section.
Namely, the limit turnout does not depend on the initial distribution of political prefer-
ences. In addition, in the limit, the majority group loses its initial advantage, and a group
beneﬁts from a favorable cost distribution to the extent of its lowest cost vis-a-vis the rival’s.
The distinction between a large and small election becomes most transparent when
 = . The advantage from being in the majority or from having a favorable cost
distribution identiﬁed in Proposition 1 for a small election completely vanish in the limit,
making each alternative equally likely to win. Moreover, two large elections one with  = 5
and one with  6= 5 result in equal limiting turnouts.18 Hence, the widely held intuition
that elections with a more evenly split electorate should generate a greater expected turnout
appears to be a property of small elections.
Proposition 2 also uniﬁes various results pertaining to large electorates in the costly
voting literature. For instance, it implies that an expected minority whose members are
likely to have lower cost-beneﬁt ratios may end up winning the election if the electorate size
is suﬃciently large. Indeed, this is what Campbell (1999), in rationalizing minority upsets
in elections, ﬁnds, though he doesn’t provide a complete asymptotic characterization. In
a sense, it is the “quality” — not the “quantity” — of supporters that counts in order to
win an election. In a more recent paper, Krasa and Polborn (2009), using a special case
of the present model where  =  and thus  = , investigate socially optimal
voting subsidies or nonvoting penalties, and have independently discovered that without
such interventions, each alternative wins a large election with probability 1
2.P r o p o s i t i o n2
shows that the assumption of equal cost lower bounds is both necessary and suﬃcient for




 =0 } = .
18In a previous version of this paper, we determined that if  =  =  and  is small, the aggregate




2 result, pointing to its knife-edge nature. If the cost lower bounds are not equal, then
o n es t i l lo b t a i n st h ei n t u i t i v er e s u l tt h a tt h eg r o u pw i t hac o s ta d v a n t a g ei ss t r i c t l ym o r e
likely to win a large election. Finally, Taylor and Yildirim (2010) who analyze the impact
of public information about the distribution of political preferences on election outcomes
and welfare, also uncover the 1
2 result to be the probability of winning in a large electorate
where each agent has a ﬁxed and equal cost of voting, i.e., a degenerate cost distribution.19
Proposition 2 reveals that while the result would remain true with the introduction of a
nondegenerate cost distribution, if voting costs are ﬁxed, then they must be equal in order
for neutrality to obtain. Said diﬀerently, in a large election, a model with equal ﬁxed voting
costs and a model with symmetric cost uncertainty are strategically equivalent if and only
if the ﬁxed voting cost in the ﬁrst model equals the lowest possible cost in the second one.
By utilizing the Poisson characterization, we can also link the costly voting model to
Myerson’s Poisson games, and in the process answer the third point made in the beginning
of this section. Inspired mostly by large elections, Myerson (1998, 2000) introduced the
concept of Poisson games, where the number of players (the electorate size, here) is distrib-
uted according to a Poisson distribution with an exogenous mean, rather than being ﬁxed.
However, as Myerson (2000, p.27) notes, because abstentions occur in equilibrium with
costly voting, this interpretation is nontrivial. In particular, the expected number of active
players, ∗
, is endogenously determined by asymptotic equilibrium strategies. Moreover,
within the set of active players, it is incorrect to assume that the probability that an agent
votes for alternative  is  Rather, large elections analyzed here correspond to a Poisson
game where the mean population is ∗
 + ∗






,w h i c hi s1
2 in the special case of  = .
5 On the Uniqueness of Type-Symmetric Equilibrium
Armed with the characterization of the pivot probability in Lemma 1, we now establish a
suﬃcient condition for the uniqueness of type-symmetric equilibrium, which received some
attention in the costly voting literature. Börgers (2004) showed that when all agents are
ex ante symmetric, i.e.,  =  and  = , then the type-symmetric equilibrium is
unique. Goeree and Grosser (2007), and Taylor and Yildirim (2010) proved the uniqueness
of type-symmetric equilibrium in totally mixed strategies when  6=  and each agent
19As mentioned in the previous section, Goeree and Grosser (2007) also ﬁnd the
1
2 result, but only for a
small electorate.
16has a ﬁxed and equal cost of voting. Given the special structures in these investigations,
however, it is diﬃcult to understand what drives the uniqueness result and whether or not
it is robust to (at least) small perturbations. In particular, all of these studies have utilized
two observations:  =  =  at an equilibrium, and the pivot probability along this
path, namely (), is strictly decreasing in . Neither of these observations is true in
general, as we now know from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 above. Intuitively though, the
uniqueness result should continue to hold if  and  are suﬃciently close in equilibrium.20











 ≤ 1, then there exists a unique
type-symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. We ﬁrst make some preliminary observations. Fixing 0 ∈ [0 ],l e tb  ≡
(0) ∈ [0 ] be a solution to Φ( 0)=0 . (0) exists because Φ(0 0) 








for some region of 0,t h e n(0) is single-valued and diﬀerentiable in this region;






0 ≤ . More importantly, 0
(0)=  
0( 0),w h i c h ,b y
part (ii) of Lemma 1, means 0
(0)=   − 0.











































0 ). This means that both equilibria are in the region of
( 0) in which (0) is single-valued and diﬀerentiable. Moreover, since both
equilibria are also in the region with  ≥ , it follows that 0
() ≥ 0 and
0
() ≤ 0, where equalities hold only when  = . Without loss of generality,
suppose ∗
  ∗∗
 . Then, (∗
)  (∗∗
 ),i m p l y i n gt h a t∗
 ≥ ∗∗
 . But, this
means (∗
) ≥ (∗∗
 ) and thus ∗
 ≤ ∗∗















20For  =2 , uniqueness obtains without any additional condition because, by Lemma 1, ( 02) is
independent of 0 and so is Φ( 02).
17To prove the second part, note that Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of a type-
symmetric equilibrium, (∗
 ∗
). If, in addition,  =  and 
 ≤ 1,t h e nP r o p o -






























 ≤ 1 for any type-symmetric equilibrium,
which, by the ﬁrst part of the proposition, must be unique. ¥
As suggested above, the potential source of multiple equilibria is that members of some
political group view their votes as complements rather than substitutes. In light of Lemma
1, such complementarity between the votes can occur only in the group whose members’ ex
ante probability of voting is far below the rival’s so that the free-rider incentive is not strong
enough to overwhelm the coordination incentive. The ﬁr s tp a r to fP r o p o s i t i o n3s i m p l ys a y s
that when equilibrium voting strategies are suﬃciently symmetric across the groups, the
free-rider incentive dominates for all individuals. The second part of Proposition 3 provides
a parametric condition under which a unique type-symmetric equilibrium obtains. In par-
ticular, it demonstrates that Börgers’ uniqueness result derived under complete symmetry,
i.e.,  =  and  =  is robust to (at least) small perturbations. That is, if agents
are suﬃciently symmetric, then their equilibrium strategies are suﬃciently close for the
free-rider incentive to dominate and make the equilibrium unique.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
There are two ways to interpret the contribution of this paper. First, it deepens our un-
derstanding of the rational choice theory of voting in its purest form, and second, by doing
so, it allows for richer and better grounded empirical and experimental investigation. Some
prominent recent developments in voting theory have been concentrated around a model
involving “group-based ethical voters” who care not only about their own payoﬀ but also
the payoﬀs of others with similar political preferences (Feddersen (2004)). While we believe
the group-based approach shows some promise, we also believe there are further directions
in which rational voting theory can be fruitfully extended to better reﬂect reality.
For one, it would be useful to expand the notion of a pivotal vote to recognize the fact
that the vote counting process is imperfect.21 Hence, it would be edifying to extend the basic
21In fact, in many states in the U.S. if a vote count is too close, then a recount is either triggered
18model to explicitly account for the vote counting technology, and to study its implications on
voter behavior. Another important assumption of the basic theory that could be proﬁtably
relaxed is that costs of voting are independently distributed across citizens. There are many
factors such as weather and security concerns that inﬂuence costs of voting for large groups
of citizens. Hence, an extension that allows for cost correlation would also be valuable. We
leave these extensions for future work and conclude by remarking simply that there is still
a lot to discover in the context of rational voting theory.
automatically or may be demanded by the potential loser.
19AA p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :First, note that a type  agent’s expected payoﬀsf r o mv o t i n ga n d






























0 (1 − 0)−1−−0 +
µ






















































0 (1 − 0)−1−−
⎤
⎦
To understand these expected payoﬀs, ﬁxat y p e agent, and let  be the number of
votes for alternative  excluding his, and 0 be the number of all votes for alternative 0.
Clearly, if 0 ≤  − 1 and 0 ≥  +2 , then alternative  respectively wins and loses
with probability 1, regardless of the type  agent’s action. If 0 = , alternative  wins
with probability 1 if the type  agent in question votes, and wins with probability 1
2 if he
abstains and leaves the tie. Finally, if 0 =  +1 , alternative  loses with probability 1 if
the type  agent abstains; but may win with probability 1
2 if he votes. These events explain
the expressions in parentheses above. The ﬁrst two summations in  1
 and  0
 account for
the distribution of preferences.
Next, subtracting  0
 from  1
 , the third summation inside parentheses cancel out, re-
ducing the net expected payoﬀ to
∆ =  1




































0 (1 − 0)−2−−
¸
− 
20Now, recall  =  and deﬁne  = (1 − ). By substituting for these terms into





(1 − )−1− =( 1− )(1 − )−1−−
(1 − )−1− =( 1− )+1(1 − )−2−−



































































































 − 1 − 2
¶µ
















  +1 − 2 − 2
¶µ














































































0 ( + 0)−2−2 − 








































and, without loss of generality, change index of summations to  in the last equality. The
expressions in (1) and (2) then follows by simply observing that  +  =1−  − .
Next, we proceed to Lemma 1. Let ( 0) ∈ (0 ) × (0 0).U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of
( 0) in (2) and canceling the ﬁrst terms, part (i) follows because





















!( +1 ) ! (  − 3 − 2)!
+1
 







!!( − 2 − 2)!









!!( − 2 − 2)!









!( +1 ) ! (  − 3 − 2)!

+1
0 (1 −  − 0)−3−2










!( +1 ) ! (  − 3 − 2)!


0(1 −  − 0)−3−2
where the summation is 0 for  =2for all ( 0).









( − 1)!!( − 1 − 2)!
−1
 






!!( − 2 − 2)!








( − 1)!( +1 ) ! (  − 2 − 2)!
−1
 +1






!( +1 ) ! (  − 3 − 2)!

+1
0 (1 −  − 0)−3−2
Note that the ﬁrst and the last terms cancel out. Separating the term for  =0 , the second





















!!( − 2 − 2)!
−1
 
0(1 −  − 0)−2−2
−( − 1)(1 −  − 0)−2
A similar line of derivation shows that for an even , only the upper bound in the above
summation switches to −2














!!( − 2 − 2)!
−1
 
0(1 −  − 0)−2−2
−( − 1)(1 −  − 0)−2







0,t h e n 





Together with 1 −  − 0 6=0 , it follows that 
0( 0)  0.
23To prove part (iv), we begin by noting that






(!)2( − 1 − 2)!










!( +1 ) ! (  − 2 − 2)!

+1

















!( +1 ) ! (  − 1 − 2)!

+1
0 (1 −  − 0)−1−2





















(!)2( − 1 − 2)!


0(1 −  − 0)−2





(!)2( − 1 − 2)!








( − 1)!!( − 2)!


0(1 −  − 0)−2





(!)2( − 1 − 2)!








!( +1 ) ! (  − 2 − 2)!
+1
 +1
0 (1 −  − 0)−2−2
24Inserting this into (A-2) and canceling terms yield
( 0) − ( 0+1 )





(!)2( − 1 − 2)!








!( +1 ) ! (  − 2 − 2)!

+1






!( +1 ) ! (  − 1 − 2)!

+1









!(+1)!(−2−2)!,w er e - w r i t et h e
last summation in three terms. Moreover, we expand the ﬁrst and second summations by
multiplying with (+0) and (1−2), respectively. Canceling and collecting terms then
reveal






!( +1 ) ! (  − 1 − 2)!

+1






(!)2( − 1 − 2)!








!( +1 ) ! (  − 2 − 2)!

+1
0 (1 −  − 0)−2−2
For  = 0,c l e a r l y( 0) − ( 0+1 ) 0.F o r 6= 0,n o t et h a t
( 0) − ( 0+2 ) = [ ( 0) − ( 0+1 ) ]
+[( 0+1 )− ( 0+2 ) ]
Performing similar decompositions to those above, it follows that ( 0)−( 0+
2)  0. ¥
Before proving Lemmas 2 and 3, we note the following useful result.
Lemma A1. Fix a pair ( ) ∈ [0 ] × [0 ] such that ( ) 6=( 0 0).T h e n ,
lim→∞ ( )=l i m →∞ ( )=0 .
25Proof of Lemma A1. Fix a pair ( ) ∈ [0 ] × [0 ] such that ( ) 6=
(00).L e t and  be the number of votes for alternatives  and , respectively, and
0 = −− be the number abstentions. Clearly, (  0) ∼Multinomial( 1−
 − |).B yd e ﬁnition of the pivot probability in (2), this means
( )=P r { =0 } +P r { =1 }
where  ≡ − such that []=(−) and  []=[(1−





which implies Pr{ =0 } → 0 and Pr{ =1 } → 0 as  →∞ . Hence,
( ) → 0. Re-labeling, it also follows that ( ) → 0. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . Suppose, to the contrary, lim→∞ ∗
()  0.S i n c e ∗
() ∈
[0 ], by Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, there is a subsequence b ∗
() that converges to
some 0.T h i si m p l i e s :b ∗
()  0 for a suﬃciently large , and together with Lemma A1,
(b ∗
() ∗
0()) → 0 as  →∞ . Using (4), the latter further implies Φ(b ∗
() ∗
0()) 
0 for a suﬃciently large , and thus b ∗
()=0— a contradiction. Hence, lim→∞ ∗
()=0 .
To prove the second part, suppose, to the contrary, lim→∞[∗
()] = ∞. Then,
clearly ∗
()  0 for a large  and thus Φ(∗
() ∗
0()) = 0.M o r e o v e r , f o r a ﬁxed ,
we can use a multinomial decomposition for the pivot probability as in Lemma A1 above,
and ﬁnd that (∗
() ∗




0())   and Φ(∗
() ∗
0())  0 for a suﬃciently large , yielding a
contradiction. Hence, lim→∞[∗
()]  ∞. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 .Immediately follows from Lemma 3 and eq.(3). ¥
Proof of Lemma 5. Note ﬁrst that the marginal distribution of ∗
−1 conditional





()). Since, by Lemma 4, ∗
() → 0 and
∗
() → ∗















As a result, the limiting distributions, of ∗
∞ and ∗
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